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The UCC's Consignment Rule
Needs an Exception for Consumers*
JOHN DOLAN **
"[A]II of these [certain UCC rules for merchants] rest on the vital
need for distinguishing merchants from housewives ..
I. INTRODUCTION
It is classic learning that Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
requires creditors claiming nonpossessory interests in goods to file a financing
statement so that third parties will have notice of the interests and will not rely
on the debtor's possession, that is, will not be misled by the debtor's osten-
sible ownership of the goods. The development of credit practices since the
drafting and adoption of the Code render that rationale invalid when the third
party is a creditor, as opposed to a buyer. That is not to suggest that we do
away with the Code's filing scheme, but rather that we look, in the creditor
context, to a different rationale for support of that scheme.
That support lies not in a need to protect third-party creditors but in a
need to inhibit practices that commercial law deems fraudulent. Third-party
creditors usually find the unrecorded interests or are not hurt by ignoring
them. Modern credit practices and realities make it impossible for the creditor
to rely solely on a filing search and on the debtor's possession of goods. The
many exceptions to the filing rules and the important buyer-protection rules
render that kind of credit investigation unsound, and modem credit practices
support the view that it is obsolete.2
One case does exist, however, in which the sophisticated credit search
does not find the unrecorded interest: that in which the debtor and a creditor
deliberately hide that interest. In order to catch these fraudulent conceal-
ments and inhibit them, we indorse the Code's filing rules. Those rules, of
course, cast a wide net and sometimes ensnare an innocent creditor, but the
cost of separating the innocent creditor that fails to file through inadvertence
or ignorance from the fraudulent creditor that intentionally hides his interest
is heavy, and the Code wisely favors rules that apply to creditors, both in-
nocent and fraudulent.
* I would like to express my appreciation to Mr. Max Langlois van den Bergh and his staff at the library
of the Molengraaff Institute for Private Law, Utrecht, for their gracious assistance to me during the preparation
of the Article.
** Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. LL.B., University of Illinois College of Law,
1965.
1. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK L. REV'N COMNMN FOR 1954, HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 108 (1954) (statement of K. Llewellyn).
2. See infra part V.
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At first blush this substitution of a fraud-in-law rationale for the classic
ostensible-ownership rationale does not appear to make much difference.
Both justifications support the view that creditors must file. The substitution
does make a difference, however, in the anomolous situation in which a
consumer finances a merchant's inventory. That situation arises when a con-
sumer consigns personal, family, or household goods to a merchant for sale;
and just as it is anomolous to think of a consumer as financing the merchant's
inventory, so it is to apply inventory financing rules to the consumer. The
plain language of the Code, however, does apply them to the consumer-con-
signor.
3
In a narrow context, this Article shows that by substituting the antifraud
rationale for the classic rationale, courts will be able to fashion a principled
exception to that plain language and to the anomalous result it dictates. In the
broader context, this Article suggests the need to test application of Code
filing rules in other situations, especially those involving consumers, when
those rules may satisfy the old rationale but not the new.
II. THE CONSIGNMENT DEVICE
The consignment is a legal device whereby an entruster (the consignor)
delivers goods to an entrustee (the consignee) for sale and both parties agree
that the consignor shall retain title and the consignee will be a "mere" or
"naked" agent-bailee. The consignment device has a checkered history in
commercial law. The notion is at once simple, seductive, and commercially
baleful. The merchants who invented it argued that, unless authorized by the
owner of the goods, the bailee could convey no interest to a buyer or creditor
because the bailee had no interest of his own to convey and no authority to
convey the owner's interest. In the heyday of the factor courts accepted that
argument; 4 but with the demise of factoring observers of commercial law
denied the consignor his ownership claim and damned him as a secret lienor
and pariah of commercial law.5 In accordance with this latter view, so many
courts fashioned exceptions to the consignment definition that it became use-
less as a security device. They fashioned these exceptions with rules of
estoppel, apparent authority, and ostensible ownership 6 and with distinctions
between false and true consignments. Courts distinguished false consign-
ments, in which the parties created a disguised security agreement, from true
consignments, in which the parties had no intention of using the consignment
device to secure payment of the purchase price.7
3. See infra part VII.
4. See, e.g., Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231 U.S. 522 (1913).
5. See generally I G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 73-75 (1965).
6. E.g., Kearby v. Western States Sec. Co., 31 Ariz. 104, 250 P. 766 (1926); Zendman v. Henry Winston.
Inc., 305 N.Y. 180, 111 N.E.2d 871 (1953). See generally L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF SALES, §§ 61.
78 (2d ed. 1959).
7. E.g., Liebowitz v. Voiello, 107 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1939); hi re Leflys. 229 F. 695 (7th Cir. 1916). Contra
General Elec. Co. v. Martin, 99 W. Va. 519, 130 S.E. 299 (1925).
[Vol. 44:21
1983] THE UCC'S CONSIGNMENT RULE 23
The parties' intent always has been difficult for courts to divine, 8 and
section 2-326 of the Uniform Commercial Code obviates this difficulty by
rendering the distinction between true and false consignments unimportant in
the financing context. 9 With respect to third-party creditors, the section de-
stroys the effect of the true consignment unless the consignor complies with
the filing provisions of the Secured Transactions Article' or shows that under
local practices his retained interest is generally known. " The section renders
the interest of the consignor-owner subordinate' 2 to the claims' 3 of the
bailee's creditors and thus virtually renders a true consignment the equivalent
of an unperfected security interest. For example, an automobile manufacturer
that consigns automobiles to a dealer and fails to comply with the perfection
rules of Article 9 will be unable to prevent the secured creditors and lien
creditors of the dealer 4 from satisfying their claims out of the consigned
8. "It is neither easy nor practical to say where a consignment ends and a sale begins." Liebowitz v.
Voiello, 107 F.2d 914. 916-17 (2d Cir. 1939).
9. See infra note 40.
10. The consignor may, however, use the terms "consignor" and "consignee" rather than "creditor" and
"'debtor". See U.C.C. § 9-408 (1978).
1I. Subsection 2-326(3) provides:
Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such person maintains a place of business at which
he deals in goods of the kind involved, under a name other than the name of the person making
delivery, then with respect to claims of creditors of the person conducting the business the goods are
deemed to be on sale or return. The provisions of this subsection are applicable even though an
agreement purports to reserve title to the person making delivery until payment or resale or uses such
words as "on consignment" or "on memorandum". However, this subsection is not applicable if the
person making delivery
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor's interest or the like to be evidenced by a
sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is generally known by his creditors to be
substantially engaged in selling the goods of others, or
(c) complies with the filing provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9).
Id. § 2-326(3).
12. The statute does not use the word "subordinate," but says that the goods are "subject to" the claims
of creditors. Id. § 2-326(2). The "subject to" language should not be read to mean that the rights of the consignor
are relative to the rights of the creditors. In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960), read the words "subject to"
in that fashion, but Kra'itz concerned construction of§ 2-702(3), which renders the right of a seller to reclaim
"subject to" the "'rights" of lien creditors. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1978). The Kravitz court concluded that the
"subject to" language did not command the court to subordinate the seller's right to that of the lien creditor, but
commanded the court to compare the two rights to determine whether law outside the Code rendered the one or
the other superior. See also Federal's, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. (In re Federal's, Inc.), 553 F.2d 509,
511-12 (6th Cir. 1977) (reading "subject to" in the same way). No court has adopted that view of the "subject
to" language in § 2-326. But see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 886 (2d ed. 1980).
13. Under § 2-326(2) the rights of the consignor are not subject to the rights of the consignee's creditors. It
is the goods that are subject to the claims of the consignee's creditors. General creditors have no claim to the
consignee's goods until those creditors become lien creditors or secured parties. Comment 2 of § 2-326,
however, asserts that § 2-326(3), the imputation rule which prevents the consignor from using distinctions
between sales and agency to escape the rule of § 2-326(2). resolves doubts "in favor of the general creditors" of
the consignee. U.C.C. § 2-326 comment 2, sentence 1 (1978). That comment is inconsistent with the language of
§ 2-326(2) and appears to be overbroad. See infra note 14. But cf. General Elec. Co. v. Pettingell Supply Co., 347
Mass. 631, 199 N.E.2d 326 (1964) (holding that an assignee for the benefit of creditors defeats a consignor who
fails to comply with § 2-326(3)).
14. Subsection 2-326(2) renders the consigned goods subject to the "claims" of the consignee's creditors,
i.e., subject to the rights of creditors having an interest in the goods. U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1978). The only persons
who possibly can have that interest under the Code's general scheme would be secured creditors (both perfected
and unperfected) and lien creditors. Unsecured creditors that have no lien have no "claim" to the goods. But cf.
U.C.C. § 2-326 comment 2. sentence I (1978).
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
inventory.' 5 It is immaterial, moreover, whether the consignment is a true
consignment or a disguised security interest. If it is a true consignment, sec-
tion 2-326 requires filing unless local practice renders the consignment a
matter of public knowledge. If the consignment is a disguised security in-
terest, Article 9 mandates filing.
Recently courts have declined to apply section 2-326 to several cases in
which the consignors were consumers. 16 The courts appear to have reached
the correct results, but their justifications are unconvincing and have done
mischief to valuable commercial principles. 17
This Article concludes that it is time to define explicitly an exception to
the consignment rule in favor of entrusters who also are consumers. This new
consumer exception is supported by both the rationale for the Code's anti-
consignment rule in section 2-326 and the Code's general rules of construc-
tion. This Article argues first that the entrustment rules of the Code and the
common law, though originally bottomed on ostensible-ownership theory, are
now valid only as antifraud provisions that serve intuitive notions of judicial
efficiency; second, that an exception under section 2-326 for consumer en-
trusters does not offend the antifraud presumptions of the rule; and third, that
courts, therefore, should adopt and freely acknowledge such a consumer
exception to section 2-326.
III. THE CONSIGNMENT RULE IN PERSPECTIVE
The problem of consignments is one part of a grand contest in commer-
cial law: the dispute between true owners on the one hand and purchasers on
the other. In the consignment setting the true owner is the consignor and the
purchaser' 8 is a creditor of the consignee retailer. Thus, if a wholesale dis-
tributor of books consigns a shipment to a retail bookstore, the dispute will
arise when the bookstore's creditor-for example, the store's trustee in bank-
ruptcy-and the distributor both claim the books.
15. An arena of dispute remains, of course, between the consignor on the one hand and buyers from the
dealer on the other. U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2), 9-301(l)(c), 9-306(2), and 9-307(l) (1978), deal with that arena. If the
consignment section of Article 2 leaves any breath in the life of consignments, those provisions of Articles 2 and
9 smother it completely. See infra part III.
16. This Article's use of the term "'consumer" rather than the term "nonmerchant" reflects the judgment
that the exception advocated here should benefit only those persons who are not engaging in mercantile activity
and are disposing of their personal, family, or household effects. The law should recognize that such sales are
essentially noncommercial. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-307(2) (1978) (generally differentiating such sales by a consumer from
sales by a merchant). I intentionally have eschewed the term "nonmerchant," though that term might well fit.
Cf. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1978) (defining "merchant"). Unfortunately, cases do exist that refuse to apply the term
'merchant" to activity that is mercantile in nature. See, e.g., Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 395
S.W.2d 555 (1965); Coast Laundry, Inc. v. Lincoln City, 9 Or. App. 521,497 P.2d 1224 (1972). Thus, the term
'consumer" avoids any implication that mercantile activity might fall within the exception.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 89-129.
18. Subsection 1-201(32) defines "'purchase" to include taking an interest in goods by, among other
methods, voluntary pledge or lien. U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (1978). Significantly, however, the anticonsignor rule of§
2-326(2) benefits creditors whether or not they rise to the level of purchasers. For example, the trustee in
bankruptcy, who is not a purchaser, benefits from § 2-326(2). Id. § 2-326(2).
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Rules apart from those of consignment govern disputes between the
wholesaler and retail buyers. A brief look at these buyer-protection rules,
which run parallel to the rule proposed by this Article, will put the consign-
ment rule in perspective.
Generally, an innocent buyer of books from the retailer will prevail over
the wholesaler. Such a buyer, because it takes from a retailer, is one in
ordinary course 9 and will defeat the entrusting wholesaler under the rules of
section 2-403(2).2o Whether the consignment is true or false, the Code con-
sistently protects these buyers. Because of this consistent treatment, the
difficulty in distinguishing true from false consignments is obviated under the
Code in the context of buyer protection.
First is the true consignment. Here the wholesaler is a principal and the
retailer its agent. Second is the false consignment, in which the wholesaler is a
disguised creditor and the retailer its debtor. Article 2 protects the buyer in
the former,2 ' and Article 9 in the latter.22 Thus, certain buyers-those that are
buyers in ordinary course-will defeat a wholesaler that entrusts books to a
retailer in either a true or a false consignment. Generally, these buyers are
consumers. Persons buying in bulk or not in the ordinary course of business
do not always qualify for protection against the distributor. Sometimes they
do qualify for protection, 23 but the point is that innocent, good faith con-
sumer-buyers always do, whether protected under Article 2 or Article 9.
The bookstore's creditors receive similar protection under the Code. If
the consignment is false, the wholesaler itself is a creditor, and the rules of
Article 9 govern. 24 Article 9 will protect the bookstore's other creditors unless
the wholesaler has complied with the perfection rules of the Article. If it fails
to comply, it is an unperfected secured party. 5 Its retention of title under the
consignment theory will be of no avail.26 An unperfected secured party will
lose to other secured parties that perfect 27 and to creditors that obtain a lien.
28
In true consignment cases the result in the dispute between the whole-
saler and the bookstore's creditors is largely the same as that in false con-
19. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978) (defining "buyer in ordinary course of business").
20. Subsection (2) of§ 2-403 provides: "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of
business." Id. § 2-403(2).
21. See id.
22. See id. § 9-301(1)(c) (buyer who gives value and takes delivery without knowledge of wholesaler's
unperfected security interest defeats claim of wholesaler); id. § 9-306(2) (buyer protected against wholesaler's
perfected security interest if the wholesaler authorizes sales); id. § 9-307(l) (buyer in ordinary course protected
against wholesaler's perfected security interest).
23. See id. §§ 9-301(l)(c), -306(2).
24. See id. § 9-102(l), (2).
25. See id. § 9-303(l).
26. See id. § 9-202 (provisions of Article 9 apply whether title is in the secured party or the debtor).
27. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank v. Tina Marie Homes, Inc., 28 Colo. App. 477, 476 P.2d 573 (1970);
American Nat'l Bank v. Christensen, 28 Colo. App. 501, 476 P.2d 281 (1970); see generally U.C.C. § 9-312(5)
(1978).
28. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1978).
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signment cases. The governing provision, however, is not in Article 9, which
applies when the consignment is false and the wholesaler is a disguised cred-
itor, but section 2-326, which applies to true consignments in which the dis-
tributor is a principal and the bookstore its agent. The resolution of the dis-
pute between the true consignor and the agent's creditors requires a close
look at section 2-326.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 2-326
Analysis of section 2-326 begins with the rule that Article 9 governs a
"consignment intended as security" 2 9-the false consignment. In false con-
signment cases, in which the book distributor and the retailer stand in a
creditor-debtor relationship, section 2-326 does not apply. It applies only in
cases of true consignment, in which the distributor is the principal and the
retailer an agent. The true consignment is a bailment-the broadest term that
describes delivery of goods to a party who will not become their owner.
Leases, storage arrangements, and service contracts under which an owner
delivers goods to a party for repair or fabrication are also typical bailments,
but these bailments differ from a true consignment because they do not entail
delivery for the ultimate purpose of sale.30
Section 2-326 describes this sale aspect of the true consignment in lan-
guage that is problematical. First, the provision eschews the term "consign-
ment ' 3 ' altogether for the term "sale or return." A sale or return occurs if
delivered goods "may be returned by the buyer" and if they are "delivered
primarily for resale.",32 A true consignment, of course, is not a sale between
the book distributor and the bookstore. A sale "consists in the passing of title
from the seller to the buyer for a price."-33 In the true consignment, however,
the distributor specifically reserves title in itself. A "buyer," moreover, is "a
person who buys or contracts to buy goods." 34 Under the consignment device
the true consignee-bookstore is not a buyer, but an agent holding the goods of
the distributor.
Despite the problematical language of subsection 2-326(1), section 2-326
does apply to the true consignment's principal-agent relationship. Subsection
2-326(3) provides that when "goods are delivered to a person for sale and such
person maintains a place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind
involved, under a name other than the name of the person making delivery,
then ... the goods are deemed to be on sale or return.", 35 Thus, subsection
29. Id. § 9-102(2).
30. See, e.g., Medomak Canning Co. v. William Underwood Co. (In re Medomak Canning Co.), 25 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 437 (Bankr. D. Me. 1977), aff'd without opinion, 588 F.2d 818 (Ist Cir. 1978).
31. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978) (specifically referring to "consignments" and to § 2-326 as containing
"'the provisions on consignment sales"). Note that in § 2-326(3) the provision uses the term in quotation marks.
Id. § 2-326(3).
32. Id. § 2-326(l)(b) (emphasis added).
33. Id. § 2-106(1).
34. Id. § 2-10 3(l)(a).
35. For the language of § 2-326(3), see supra note 11.
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2-326(3) creates an imputation rule: 36 it estops the parties, whatever their
intent or characterization of the transaction, from disputing the claim of the
bookstore's creditor by arguing that the books belong to the distributor.37
Section 2-326 operates on the assumption that notwithstanding any agency
and bailment arguments, the parties intended a sale and the bookstore holds
an interest in the books.38
This imputation of a sale avoids in one stroke the complex inquiry that
attended common-law attempts to distinguish true from false consignments.39
In short, both true and false consignments fall within section 2-326. Article 9,
however, preempts the application of the section in false consignment cases.
That preemption may not make much difference, however, because Article 9
treatment of false consignments is virtually identical to section 2-326 treat-
ment of true ones. 40 The significant point for this discussion is that true
consignments do fall within the rule of section 2-326.
That rule, furthermore, basically disfavors the book distributor in its
contest with the bookstore's creditors. Subsection (2) establishes the general
36. The comment reports that the whole section "'presupposes that a contract for sale is contemplated by
the parties." U.C.C. § 2-326 comment I, paragraph 3 (1978).
37. General Elec. Co. v. Pettingell Supply Co., 347 Mass. 631, 633-34, 199 N.E.2d 326, 328 (1964), is the
leading case for the view that it is unnecessary to show a sale by the wholesaler to the distributor to apply §
2-326. See also Bischoff v. Thomasson, 400 So. 2d 359, 365 (Ala. 1981).
38. Pursuant to the general policies of this Act which require good faith not only between the parties to
the sales contract, but as against interested third parties, subsection (3) resolves all reasonable doubts
as to the nature of the transaction in favor of the general creditors of the buyer. As against such
creditors words such as "on consignment" or "on memorandum", with or without words of reserva-
tion of title in the seller, are disregarded when the buyer has a place of business at which he deals in
goods of the kind involved.
U.C.C. § 2-326 comment 2 (1978). Accord it re A & T Kwik-N-Handi, Inc., 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
779 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1973); In re Novak, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 196 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1969); American
Nat'l Bank v. Tina Marie Homes, Inc., 28 Colo. App. 477, 476 P.2d 573 (1970). General Elec. Co. v. Pettingell
Supply Co., 347 Mass. 631, 199 N.E.2d 326 (1964). U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978), says that all true consignments are
"'subject to" section 2-326. and some commentators interpret that language to mean that a true consignor must
comply with one of the notice requirements in § 2-326(3). See I P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J.
MCDONNELL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 4A-72 (1982). In
Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687, 693 (Utah 1980), however, the court concluded that if the consignment was true
and the consignee did not maintain a place of business, neither Article 2 nor Article 9 applied. See hifra note 128
and accompanying text.
39. See. e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Martin, 99 W. Va. 519, 523, 130 S.E. 299, 300-01 (1925), in which the
court lists several considerations in making the determination. The process at common law in distinguishing the
true consignment (a bailment) from the false consignment (a security agreement) was similar to the difficult
procedure courts now follow when trying to distinguish a true lease (a bailment) from a disguised installment
sales contract (a security agreement). See, e.g., In re Peacock, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1671 (Bankr.
N.D, Tex. 1980).
Some courts look to the intent of the parties to determine whether the consignment falls into Article 2 or
Article 9. See Nauman v. First Nat'l Bank, 50 Mich. App. 41, 212 N.W.2d 760 (1973); Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Liddicoat, 65 Wis. 2d 612,223 N.W.2d 530 (1974); Columbia Int'l Corp. v, Kempler, 46 Wis. 2d 550, 175 N.W.2d
465 (1970). The last two cases make a facile distinction. In both cases the Supreme Court of Wisconsin argued
that Article 2 applies if the parties are using the consignment to maintain the resale price. Parties, however, may
use resale price maintenance and a credit sale in the same transaction.
40. For the purpose of determining the validity of the parties' arrangement, two differences exist in Code
treatment of true consignments under Article 2 and false ones under Article 9. The first difference arises when
the consignor files a financing statement but does not obtain a written consignment agreement signed by the
consignee. If that consignment is false, Article 9 applies, and the failure to have a signed security agreement
renders the consignor an unsecured creditor. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1978). If the consignment is true, however,
the failure to have a signed agreement is of no moment under the Code unless the Article 2 statute of frauds
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rule that "goods held on sale or return are subject to [claims of the buyer's
creditors] while in the buyer's possession. ' , 41 Subsection (3) follows subsec-
tion (2) with the imputation rule discussed above and then exempts from that
rule true consignments in which the book distributor complies with Article 9,
observes a state sign law that permits the distributor to give notice by posting
a sign, or demonstrates that the bookstore's creditors generally knew that the
store dealt in consigned goods.42 Again, the language of subsection (3) reflects
inartful drafting. The universal understanding appears to be that a consignor,
such as the book distributor, that complies with one of the three notice rules
of subsection (3) will escape the pro-creditor rule of subsection (2).43 The
language of subsection (3), however, exempts the notifying book distributor
from the imputation rule of subsection (3), not the pro-creditor rule of sub-
section (2). 44 Courts, quite properly, have not read section 2-326 in that
fashion, but have indicated that a book distributor which fits into the excep-
tions in subsection (3) not only escapes the imputation rule of subsection (3)
but also escapes the pro-creditor rule of subsection (2).45 The chief precept of
the consignment section, then, is quite plain: a distributor that fails to provide
public notice of its interest will lose to the bookstore's creditors that have
governs. Id. § 2-201. The second difference arises when the consignor attempts to escape the creditor's claim via
exceptions (a) and (b) of § 2-326(3). Those exceptions are available only to true consignors.
These instances have arisen infrequently. I can find no reported cases of the first. But cf. In re De'Cor
Wallcovering Studios, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 59 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1970) (in which the consignor
had neither a signed agreement nor a filing). Cases concerning exceptions (a) and (b) are equally rare. I find none
in which a court has applied exception (a) and only one in which exception (b) was applied. That one case, In re
Griffin. I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 492 (W.D. Pa. 1960), appears, moreover, to misapply the rule. See infra
text accompanying notes 111-14. It is significant, moreover, that when the sponsoring agencies amended the
official version of the Code in 1972, they added § 9-114, which parallels the purchase money rule of§ 9-312(3) for
secured parties, and thus evidenced a desire to treat priorities in the same fashion for both true consignors and
secured parties. See U.C.C. § 9-114 app. I, Reasons for 1972 Adoption of New Section.
The distinction between true and false consignments also may have a bearing on priority rules not governed
by § 9-114 and on the rights of the consignor in the event of the consignee's default. With the exception of §
9-114. presumably the Article 9 priority and default rules do not apply to true consignments. While the validity
questions often have been the subject of litigation, the priority and default questions have not.
41. U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1978).
42. Id. § 2-326(3).
43. See R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 49-50 (2d ed. 1979); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 884 (2d ed. 1980); Hawkland, Consignment Selling Under the Uniform Code, 67 COM.
L.J. 146, 147 (1962). See also In re Levi, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 291, 292 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1965).
44. Subsection 2-326(2) begins, of course, with the words "except as provided in subsection (3)." U.C.C.
§ 2-326(2) (1978). That phrase, however, does not correct the problem. It says simply that the pro-creditor rule
of § 2-326(2) applies except as provided in 2-326(3). Subsection 2-326(3) says its imputation rule will not operate
against the notifying book distributor. It does not say that the pro-creditor rule will not operate against the
notifying distributor, and book distributors may exist whom courts, without using the imputation rule, find to be
delivering books on a sale or return basis. While the syntax of the section supports that reading, common sense
does not.
45. See, e.g., hi re Griffin, I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 492 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1960). Most cases hold
that the consignor did not satisfy the exception, but they indicate that had he satisfied it the pro-creditor rule of
§ 2-326(2) would not apply. See, e.g., Grady v. Gennett (In re Pro-Med Co.). 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
83, 84 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); Buchanan v. Mobile Home Guar. Corp., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1150
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1974); it re Webb, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calaghan) 394 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1973); American
Nat'l Bank v. Quad Constr., Inc.. 31 Colo. App. 373. 377-78, 504 P.2d 1113. 1116 (1972).
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claims. In a word, the provision is a pro-creditor rule that penalizes the book
distributor even when it is a principal in a true consignment rather than a
disguised creditor trying to hide its interest.
V. THE FALLACY OF THE OSTENSIBLE-OWNERSHIP RATIONALE
The traditional rationale for the pro-creditor rule of section 2-326 rests on
the notion that even the true consignment is a commercially harmful device
that misleads the bookstore's creditors into extending credit on the strength of
the store's ostensible ownership of the consigned books. That notion does not
fare well, however, in light of current creditor practices. The only advantage
of the pro-creditor rule today is its inhibition of fraudulent practices at little
cost.
Comment 2 to section 2-326 articulates the traditional justification for the
pro-creditor rule of subsections 2-326(2) and 2-326(3): "The purpose of the
exception [in favor of the distributor that gives notice] is merely to limit the
effect of the present subsection itself... to cases in which creditors of the
buyer may reasonably be deemed to have been misled by the secret reserva-
tion."46 Courts generally accept this ostensible-ownership rationale.47
At one time creditors may have relied on their debtor's stock in trade, but
modem commercial lenders, beginning with the advent of open-account sell-
ing and inventory financing, stopped extending credit based on a debtor's
ostensible ownership of merchandise. Today creditors either investigate that
appearance or do not rely on it at all.
Non-real estate, commercial creditors generally fall into two classes:
sellers that permit buyers to defer payment and institutional lenders that make
discrete loans against inventory and accounts or general working capital
loans. Credit sellers usually deliver on open account with a short (thirty to
ninety day) term, but sometimes finance longer term credit on, for example,
expensive equipment. Institutional lenders frequently lend for terms of years
or on a revolving basis under which borrowers draw on a line of credit and
repay loans as cash flow requires or permits. Both types of creditor make
their credit judgments on a number of considerations, including the debtor's
credit history, its financial statements, and, in some cases, searches for filings
in favor of other creditors.
Although some inventory lenders and some working capital lenders are
concerned about inventory levels, those lenders are too sophisticated to rely
solely on inspections of the debtor's shelves or showroom and on filings.
46. U.C.C. § 2-326 comment 2. last sentence (1978) (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank v. Quad Constr.. Inc., 31 Colo. App. 373, 504 P.2d 1113 (1972);
Guardian Discount Co. v. Settles, 114 Ga. App. 418. 151 S.E.2d 530 (1966); Columbia Int'l Corp. v. Kempler, 46
Wis. 2d 550, 175 N.W.2d 465 (1970). In G.B.S. Meat Ind. Pty. Ltd. v. Kress-Dobkin Co., 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 388 (W.D. Pa. 1979), the court refused to apply § 2-326(2) in the creditor's favor because the creditor
had actual knowledge of the consignment.
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Instead, they require periodic reports by independent auditors or conduct
their own inventory checks. In either event they keep track of inventory by
certifying existing levels against supplier invoices and delivery records and
often monitor sales records and verify such information with standard audit-
ing techniques.48 In many cases, of course, a lender with a security interest in
inventory will not monitor the inventory at all but will rely on the general
financial integrity of the borrower or on guaranties from third parties. 49 The
unsecured seller on credit-the typical open-account seller-does not rely on
inventory levels and usually does not see its retail buyer's place of business.
Rather, the buyer's credit history and credit rating, which the seller does see,
determine the availability of credit.
Modern credit practices thus have outgrown the ostensible-ownership
doctrine. Creditors actually do not rely50 on their debtors' ostensible owner-
ship of inventory; 51 instead they verify that ownership with more than filing
searches, rely on other collateral, or depend on the general creditworthiness
of the borrower or a guarantor. S
Besides section 2-326, two other pro-creditor Code rules appear at first
glance to be supported by the ostensible-ownership rationale: the bulk sales
provisions in Article 6 and the Twyne rule 53 of subsection 2402(2).54 Both
48. Inventory lenders, furthermore, must be wary of the effect of the buyer-protection rules of §§ 9-306(2)
and 9-307(1). An inventory lender cannot rely for long on inventory audits because the buyer-protection rules
permit most buyers out of inventory to take free of the lender's security interest. U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2), -307(l)
(1978). Finally, inventory lenders must deal with § 2-402(2), which explicitly sanctions the practice of leaving
sold goods with the sellei for a reasonable length of time after sale. For a recent case that clearly demonstrates
the folly of creditor reliance on a merchant's naked possession of inventory, see Wilson v. M & W Gear, Inc.,
Il1. App. 3d -, 442 N.E.2d 670 (1982).
49. It would be a mistake to underestimate the extent to which lenders with security interests take those
interests only as a precaution. Because large corporations usually borrow on the strength of their financial
statements and profit history, the security interest in inventory is often a small consideration. Sometimes the
lender will not bother to take such an interest. In small, closely-held-company borrowing the lender most often
looks to the credit standing of individuals who will guarantee the debt and not to specific property of the
borrower. Inventory financing, of course, is substantial, and many lenders, especially floorplanners, rely heav-
ily on the debtor's inventory. Those lenders, however, take sophisticated measures to determine outstanding
claims to the debtor's inventory and are not fooled by a consignment arrangement.
50. That reliance does arise on the part of buyers, however, and the Code protects buyers in that reliance.
See U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2), 9-301(l)(c), 9-306(2), 9-307(l) (1978). See sapra in part III the discussion of these rules as
they relate to consignments.
51. I am mindful that the credit industry is not above crying "wolf" in the face of arguments such as those
advanced in the text. See, for example, the argument of the National Commercial Finance Conference. Inc. in
Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 240, 208 N.W.2d 97, 107 (1973). 1 have commented elsewhere
on the mischief of that argument. See Dolan, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Concept of Possession in
the Marketing and Financing of Goods, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1147 (1978). Ironically, as that article points out,
creditors rely more on their debtor's nonpossession than on his possession, because a nonpossessing debtor
usually cannot defeat the creditor's interest by selling to a buyer.
52. This view-that the ostensible-ownership doctrine no longer canjustify subordinating the claims of one
creditor to those of another-has broad implications. Some might take it to mean, for example, that purchase-
money sellers should prevail over lenders with security interests in after-acquired property. It is true that the
ostensible-ownership doctrine is not persuasive in that context, as Judge Ainsworth's dissenting opinion in
Stowers v. Mahon, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976), makes clear. Nonetheless, I do not wish to challenge Stowers
and similar cases. The integrity and efficiency of a notice-filing system, concerns different from those of the
ostensible-ownership doctrine, provide the support for the Stoweers rule. For a discussion of these questions in
yet a third setting, see Dolan, A Good Faith Purchase Study: True Owners and the Warehouse Lien. 18 HOUS.
L. REV. 267, 287-89 (1981).
53. See Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601).
54. U.C.C. § 2-402(2) (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 57-73.
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rules find no firmer support in the ostensible-ownership rationale than does
the consignment rule, but both do make sense as antifraud provisions. They
thus give us the key to rationalizing the pro-creditor consignment rule of
section 2-326, which favors the bookstore's creditor over the bookstore's
distributor.
Article 6 stipulates that the bulk buyer must notify the seller's creditors
of the impending bulk sale. 55 If it fails to do so, transfer of the merchandise to
the buyer will be "ineffective against any creditor of the transferor.", 56
Similarly, under subsection 2-402(2) 57 and common-law cases, 58 if a buyer
leaves goods in the possession of the seller beyond a commercially reasonable
period of time, a creditor of the seller may treat the sale as void.59
Both rules may appear to concern ostensible ownership, but both clearly
do not. Comment 2 to section 6-101 explains that the "central purpose [of the
bulk sales law] is to deal with two common forms of commercial fraud." 60
The effect of the Tivyne line of cases was to impute fraud 61 when the intent
required by the Statute of Elizabeth 62 rule against fraudulent conveyances 6
was missing. The Tivyne rule applied irrespective of reliance by any creditor
and forced the buyer to explain its unusual commercial conduct.
In Twyne Pierce, who owed money to C, conveyed property to Twyne,
who left Pierce in possession. 64 Nothing in that possession misled C, how-
ever, because Pierce incurred the debt to C before the conveyance. 65 In
Sturtevant v. Ballard,66 a leading American case applying the Twyne rule,
Mecker obtained judgment against Holt, who was also indebted to third
parties and conveyed assets to those third parties while remaining in posses-
sion of the goods. 67 Thus, in Sturtevant the ostensible ownership did not
mislead Mecker. In both Tivyne 6s and Sturtevant,69 however, the courts found
55. U.C.C. § 6-104(1) (1978).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 2-402(2).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 64-73.
59. Subsection 2-402(2) does not codify the Twyne rule. It sanctions the rule in states where courts have
adopted Tityne.
60. U.C.C. § 6-101 comment 2 (1978) (emphasis added). Comment 2 further provides:
(a) The merchant, owing debts, who sells out his stock in trade to a friend for less than it is worth,
pays his creditors less than he owes them, and hopes to come back into the business through the back
door some time in the future.
(b) The merchant, owing debts, who sells out his stock in trade to anyone for any price, pockets
the proceeds, and disappears leaving his creditors unpaid.
Id.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 64-73.
62. 13 Eliz. ch. 5 (1570).
63. The Statute of Elizabeth, the model for most modem fraudulent conveyance statutes, rendered the
fraudulent conveyance of-none effect." 13 Eliz. ch. 5 (1570). The Twyne rule recognized by § 2-402(2) gives the
creditors of the fraudulent transferor the right to levy on the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-402(2) (1978).
64. 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 810 (Star Ch. 1601).
65. Id.
66. 9 Johns. 337 (N.Y. 1812).
67. Id. at 338.
68. 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 823 (Star Ch. 1601).
69. 9 Johns. 337, 344 (N.Y. 1812).
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the seller's retention of the goods to be indicative of a fraud on the creditor
seeking to attach those goods.
In Benedict v. Ratner,70 a case similar to Twyne, the trustee in bank-
rutpcy challenged the practice of the bankrupt, who had conveyed accounts
to a lender but continued to collect them and hold the proceeds. In short, the
trustee was challenging an early instance of revolving, account-receivable
financing in which the lender lets the debtor handle the accounts until the
lender feels insecure, in which event the lender notifies the account debtors
and collects the accounts itself. The Benedict Court found the practice fraud-
ulent,7' and Justice Brandeis explained that the antifraud rule he invoked
"rests not upon seeming ownership because of possession retained, but upon
lack of ownership because of dominion reserved. It does not raise a presump-
tion of fraud. It imputes fraud conclusively .... ,72 It is significant that
Justice Brandeis considered the ostensible-ownership doctrine itself to be
grounded in fraud and not to be based exclusively on a desire to protect the
innocent creditor that relies on appearances of ownership. 7
In short, the bulk sales rules of Article 6 and the seller-retention rule of
subsection 2-402(2), both of which protect the creditors of persons holding the
property of others, are aimed at penalizing commercial practices that smack
of fraud. These rules, moreover, have three important similarities.
First, both antifraud rules provide an easy avenue of escape for the
honest participant. Under Article 6 the honest bulk buyer presumably will
give notice and thereby preclude any claim that it conspired with the bulk
seller to defraud the seller's creditors. In a fraudulent retention case the
honest buyer that leaves identified goods with the seller can explain the
reasonableness of its conduct and thereby escape the fraud presumption of
subsection 2-402(2). 74
Second, both rules reflect the value judgment that the cost of showing
fraudulent intent is sufficiently great that it outweighs the cost of possible
unfairness that the rules may visit on an unsuspecting buyer. Under both rules
an innocent buyer that harbors no fraudulent intent may suffer loss. Even
though the buyer in bulk may be unaware of the notice provisions of Article 6
or the inclusion of its purchase within the definition of a bulk sale, the statute
will operate against it. Similarly, the innocent and unsuspecting buyer that
leaves goods with the seller and cannot demonstrate a commercially reason-
70. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
71. Id. at 360.
72. Id. at 363.
73. The Code, of course, rejects the Benedict rule, which posed obstacles to some forms of lending. See
U.C.C. § 9-205 comments 1-4 (1978).
74. Unfortunately, courts sometimes overlook § 2-402(2), even when it clearly merits discussion. Few
modem cases exist from which we can elicit any consistent pattern. The discussion in the text, then, positing an
exception for consumers under § 2-402(2), is more theoretical than real. For two cases in which that theory
would make sense, see Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 580 P.2d 8 (1978) (a consumer case),
and Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972) (a nonconsumer case). See generally Dolan.
The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59 B.U.L. REV. 811, 838-42 (1979).
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able explanation for its conduct will lose to the seller's creditors. In both
instances it is difficult to show fraudulent intent. The adoption of these rules
reflects the value judgment that commercial gains achieved by presuming
fraud outweigh the commercial losses inflicted by those presumptions.
Last, both commercial fraud rules do not affect consumers. Few, if any,
consumer purchases would rise to the level of a bulk sale, which by definition
must comprise a major part of the seller's inventory and must occur outside
the ordinary course of business. 75 By the same token, the fraudulent retention
rule of section 2-402(2) does not easily operate against consumers. As the
court in Patten v. Smith76 observed, the practice of buying goods and leaving
them with the seller "is an extraordinary exception to the usual course of
dealing, and requires a satisfactory explanation." 77 Any buyer who can pro-
vide that explanation should have no difficulty with the rule-only the lack of
"'some sufficient motive" 78 triggers the fraud presumption. 79 Thus, a con-
sumer who leaves goods with the seller to have accessories installed, surprise
a family member, or wait for a kitchen to be painted will satisfy the rule easily.
Briefly, then, the bulk sales and fraudulent retention rules reflect similar
patterns: first, they provide an easy avenue of escape for the honest partic-
ipant; second, they presuppose that presuming fraud is more efficient than
requiring a creditor to show fraudulent intent and reliance; and third, they
tend not to operate against consumers. Casting the consignment rule of sec-
tion 2-326 as an antifraud rule rather than an ostensible-ownership rule 0
effects the same pattern.
VI. SECTION 2-326 AS AN ANTIFRAUD RULE
It may appear illogical to say on the one hand that commercial law should
penalize the secret lienor because secret liens are fraudulent, while arguing on
the other that the retailer's creditors do not rely on the retailer's possession
75. See U.C.C. § 6-102 (1978).
76. 5 Conn. 196 (1824).
77. Id. at 199.
78. Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337, 339 (N.Y. 1812).
79. But see Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972) (The buyer, itself an automobile
dealer, purchased two vehicles and, without explanation, left them with a financially ailing seller, which also
was a dealer. The court, however, did not apply the rule of § 2-402(2).). For criticism of Sherrock, see Dolan,
supra note 74, at 838-39. In Weidinger Chevrolet, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 501 F.2d 459 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974), a buyer of used cars from a dealer left them on the dealer's lot. The court did
not mention § 2-402(2), but found that the arrangement was a consignment under § 2-326 and, therefore, the
dealer's creditor defeated the buyer. Id. at 465.
80. The meaning of this Article is not that possession of goods has no bearing on commercial law. As the
previous discussion of the buyer-in-ordinary-course rules suggests, possession by a merchant seller may have
significant consequences for buyers. Similarly, the retailer's nonpossession may be significant. In re Mincow
Bag Co., 29 A.D.2d 400, 288 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366 (1968), affd, 24 N.Y.2d 776, 248 N.E.2d 26, 300 N.Y.S.2d 115
(1969), for example, holds that the consignment section does not apply in favor of the creditors of a bankrupt
against a consignor that delivered to the bankrupt's customers rather than the bankrupt. Possession does have
commercial significance, but it should not justify reliance by a creditor of the party in possession. See generally
Dolan, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Concept of Possession in the Marketing and Financing of
Goods, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1147 (1978).
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and, therefore, are not misled or harmed by the secretive conduct. Why, one
might ask, was Justice Brandeis concerned not with "seeming ownership"
but with "lack of ownership"? Why is commercial law unwilling to let the
parties determine ownership in the bulk sales, Twyne, and consignment situa-
tions as long as no one relies on the false appearances created by their ar-
rangements?
The answers to these questions lie in various concerns of the law, other
than creditor reliance, present in its treatment of ostensible ownership. In
Benedict Justice Brandeis was concerned about the law's integrity and the
ability of commercial parties to distort the concept of ownership so that an
apparent nonowner becomes an owner.8' In Twyne the Court of Star Chamber
was concerned that buyers not be permitted to engage in unusual transac-
tions-those that the Patten Court later described as "extraordinary excep-
tion[s] to the usual course of dealing' 82-without explanation for that con-
duct. Courts that invoke the Twyne rule want to know why a buyer would pay
for merchandise and yet walk away without it. If the buyer has an explana-
tion, it does not suffer the consequences of the Twyne rule; but if it does not,
the law is suspicious and assumes the buyer is engaged in fraudulent conduct
even if no one is misled. The presumption, of course, is that the Twyne buyer
is not a buyer but a lender that is trying to prevent the seller's creditors from
attaching the seller's goods.
In consignment cases commercial law should be concerned that an un-
perfected creditor, the book distributor in the false consignment setting, might
fare better than other unperfected creditors. The integrity of the filing system
rests on the assumption that creditors not in possession must file. Exceptions
to the filing rules do exist, 83 but in those cases the law assumes that the
benefits derived from the exception exceed the costs to the system.8 No
reason exists to permit the book distributor to fare better, even if no one has
been misled. Some consignors in a true consignment, however, are not cred-
itors at all but principals; and the consignment rule catches them. Experience
teaches, however, that avoiding the complex inquiry of distinguishing true
from false consignments by requiring the principal to give notice is far better
than wrestling with the distinction.
If the creditor-reliance rationale for the consignment section's pro-cred-
itor rule fails to justify the rule, the only justification lies in antifraud con-
siderations. Book distributors that secretly consign books to retailers do not
deserve protection and may not assert their title against the retailer's cred-
itors. Only two explanations exist for such conduct: the distributor is either a
81. 268 U.S. 353, 363 (1925).
82. 5 Conn. 196, 199 (1824).
83. See U.C.C. § 9-302(l) (1978).
84. The Twyne rule (and perhaps the Benedict rule) also may reflect the early common-law dissatisfaction
with the notion that possession and ownership can be separated. "Lord Kenyon said that he lamented that it
was ever decided that the possession and apparent ownership of personal property might be in one person, and
the title in another .... " Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337, 343 (N.Y. 1812).
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true consignor or a disguised inventory lender. Commercial law should pro-
tect the distributor in the former case but not in the latter. Because the cost of
distinguishing the two cases is great, the law presumes the latter and invokes
the pro-creditor rule of section 2-326 at the risk of catching a few innocent,
true consignment distributors that are unaware of the rule.
This analysis of section 2-326 and the discussion of the bulk sales and
Twyne rules is similar in other respects. The consignment section provides an
easy escape for the honest merchant that complies with section 2-326(3) just
as the other rules provide an easy escape for honest parties. The consignment
section, moreover, is like the bulk sales and Tvyne rules: all favor the cred-
itors of the third party (the bulk seller, the seller retaining possession, or the
bookstore consignee) over the true owner because the burden of distinguish-
ing true consignors from false consignors, like the burden of proving fraud-
ulent intent in the bulk sales and Twyne settings, is too great for the law to
bear. Finally, and most importantly for the thesis of this Article, the con-
signment section is similar to the bulk sales and Twyne rules because it is not
directed at consumers.
The law may have difficulty discerning the true consignor book distrib-
utor, but not distinguishing the true consignor consumer. Although book dis-
tributors often may extend credit, consumers do not.85 Consumers who
deliver books to a bookstore, antiques to a kitchen shop, or mobile homes to a
dealer are always true consignors. To invoke the consignment rule of section
2-326 against consumers would not serve the purpose of the rule. Similarly, to
invoke the rule against consumers would violate the Code's command that the
"Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying pur-
poses and policies." 8
6
VII. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE CONSUMER-CONSIGNOR ISSUE
Courts generally recognize the commercial good sense of the consumer
exception, but have not articulated a satisfactory rationale in its support.
Failure to articulate a satisfactory rationale results in two harmful con-
sequences. First, cases that favor the consumer usually distort the section and
thus make bad consignment law; 87 and second, at least one court would rule
against the consumer. 8
85. Of course, an individual may extend credit to an enterprise because of some underlying relationship.
Such an interested person, if he can claim to be a consumer, is easy to identify, and it is difficult to conceive of
his extending credit by delivering an article of merchandise. If an individual consigns a significant portion of an
enterprise's inventory, he cannot claim to be a consumer. The thesis of this Article, then, substitutes the
problem of distinguishing consumers from nonconsumers for that of distinguishing true and false consignments,
assumes that the former distinction is far easier to apply, and recognizes the vital need expressed by Professor
Llewellyn in the epigraph. See supra p. 21. See also supra note 16.
86. See U.C.C. § I-102(1) (1978). "Mhe proper construction of the Act requires that its interpretation and
application be limited to its reason." id. comment I, sentence 3. See infra text accompanying notes 137-39.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 89-129.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 129-35.
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In Allgeier v. Campisi89 the "individual owner of an automobile" 90 de-
livered it to an automobile dealer "for the purpose of having said dealer
secure offers ... and to sell the same upon approval of an offer by the indi-
vidual ... [said] dealer to receive a commission of a set sum ..... 9' The
transaction is a classic true consignment. The individual is the principal and
the dealer is the agent. The bailment clearly falls within the "deemed to be on
sale or return" rule of subsection 2-326(3). 92 As subsection 2-326(3) requires,
the goods were "delivered to a person for sale and such person [maintained] a
place of business at which he [dealt] in goods of the kind involved, under a
name other than the name of the person making delivery." 93 Any other read-
ing of subsection 2-326(3) would permit the book wholesaler to deliver large
inventories to the bookstore and escape the reach of the rule. Other readings,
then, conflict with the purpose of the consignment rule and well-reasoned
case law to the contrary. 94 The Allgeier court held, however, in a short,
one-paragraph opinion that section 2-326 did not apply. 95
The opinion's reference to the "individual owner" may be fairly read as
implying a consumer exception to the consignment provision. Subsequent
cases have read Allgeier that way,96 and the case should not stand as authority
for the proposition that a similar delivery by a nonconsumer would escape the
rule of section 2-326. The opinion's weakness is its failure to articulate any
rationale for the consumer exception. The opinion also neglects to state clear-
ly that the court did not apply the section because the consignor was a con-
sumer. Allgeier, then, fails to admit that it is framing a consumer exception
and to provide a rationale for that exception.
In Founders Investment Corp. v. Fegett97 a Kentucky court avoided the
consumer-exception issue by misconstruing the statute. The Fegett court
subscribed to the individual-commercial distinction of Allgeier, but mis-
construed the "deemed to be on sale or return" language of the section. In
Fegett a dealer sold a mobile home to Mr. Griffee, an elderly man who could
neither read nor write and whose wife subsequently became ill and was hos-
pitalized. 98 In the hope that he ultimately could avoid both his lot rental cost
and his monthly loan payments, Mr. Griffee vacated his home, moved it to the
dealer's lot, and instructed the dealer to solicit orders. 99
89. 117 Ga. App. 105, 159 S.E.2d 458 (1968).
90. Id., 159 S.E.2d at 459.
91. Id.
92. u.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1978).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Mobile Home Guar. Corp. (In re International Mobile Homes of Johnson City,
Inc.), 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1150 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1974); In re Bro Cliff, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 242 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1970); Blowers v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 Ala. App. 485, 232 So. 2d 666
(1970).
95. 117 Ga. App. 105, 159 S.E.2d 458 (1968).
96. See Founders Inv. Corp. v. Fegett, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 903 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Bischoff
v. Thomasson, 400 So. 2d 359, 367 (Ala. 1981).
97. 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 903 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
98. Id. at 904.
99. Id. at 905.
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Thus Mr. Griffee fell into the trap of the consignment rule's imputation
section, 1oo a trap that, under the thesis of this Article, results from a desire to
avoid the necessity of finding fraudulent intent. Clearly, the rule should not
apply to Mr. Griffee, and the court so held.' 0' Unfortunately, the Fegett court
was not satisfied with the unarticulated rule of Allgeier and observed that it
found "nothing in [the] record which would support an inference that the
agreement [between Griffee and the dealer] constituted a basis for a sale or
return." 02 That assertion, of course, was incorrect. The court went even
further: "At most, we glean that Griffee intended to create a limited bail-
ment or sales agency in [the dealer]."' 0 3 Such limited bailments and sales
agencies, however, are the type of consignment conduct to which the drafters
addressed section 2-326. All true consignments are limited bailments. Their
hallmark is the principal-agent relationship. In short, the Fegett court used
characteristics of a true consignment to support its position that no consign-
ment was present. If Fegett serves as precedent in merchant entrustment
cases, section 2-326 will have no room in which to operate.
In Newhall v. Haines ' 4 the court took a different tack. In Newvhall
Bobby Ruth Snider opened a boutique, in which she sold gourmet foods and
other similar items. Six months later she attempted to augment sales by add-
ing antiques and other "collectibles" to her inventory.' 5 She obtained the
former lines of merchandise from commercial suppliers and the antiques and
collectibles from local residents who responded to her newspaper advertise-
ments soliciting such wares. When the business failed, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy claimed that the antiques and collectibles were consigned merchandise
subject to the rule of section 2-326. '06 Clearly, they were governed by section
2-326 unless it does not operate against consumer-consigned merchandise.
The court, however, ruled that the imputation rule of subsection 2-326(3)
would not apply in this context.'0 7 That rule covers consignments of mer-
chandise to a person who, according to the subsection, "maintains a place of
business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved."' 08 The bankrupt,
the Newhall court held, took consigned goods at a place of business where
she dealt in gourmet foods and like effects-a kind of goods different from the
antiques and collectibles consigned. Thus, the court refused to apply the
subsection.'09
100. Some courts have demonstrated a marked reluctance to invoke the imputation rule, even in the
commercial entrustment setting. See W.N. Provenzano, Inc., v. Monahan & Co., 13 Bankr. 248 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1981); In re Boersma, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1312 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1971). For two other
cases that protect commercial consignors and implicitly reject the view of § 2-326 advanced by this Article, see
Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Liddicoat, 65 Wis. 2d 612, 223 N.W.2d 530 (1974); Columbia Int'l Corp. v. Kempler, 46
Wis. 2d 550, 175 N.W.2d 465 (1970).
101. 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 903, 905-06 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
102. Id. at 905.
103. Id.
104. 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1291 (D. Mont. 1981).
105. Id. at 1292-93.
106. Id. at 1292.
107. Id. at 1297-98.
108. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1978).
109. 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1291, 1296 (D. Mont. 1981).
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Newhall, then, is an extraordinary misreading of subsection 2-326(3). The
bankrupt in Newhall sold antiques and collectibles at her shop. She clearly
was a person described in the statutory language to which the court referred.
She maintained a place of business where she dealt in goods of the kind
entrusted-a place where she sold antiques and collectibles. The Newhall
opinion would add to subsection 2-326(3) the requirement that the consignee
deal in nonconsigned goods similar to the kind consigned. "0 Thus, if Newhall
is good precedent, section 2-326 would catch a wholesaler that consigns part
of a bookstore's inventory but not one that consigns all of a store's inventory
or all of the book inventory of a store that also sells tobacco and candy.
Newhall, then, would carve a gaping hole in the imputation rule of subsection
2-326(3) through which many commercial consignors undoubtedly would
escape.
In re Griffen"' is a case with similar facts. In Griffen individuals de-
livered used furniture to a person who formerly was in the business of clean-
ing rugs and furniture.1 2 The dealer posted a sign describing the business as
one selling new and used furniture, but no new furniture was present on the
premises. " 3 The court reasoned that, because people generally would know
that this business was selling the goods of others, exception (b) to the imputa-
tion rule of subsection 2-326(3) should apply." 4 The Griffen court's charac-
terization of the facts is not credible. If a store's sign proclaims that it sells
new and used furniture, but no new furniture is present on the premises,
Father Brown or Jane Marple might recognize that the store owner has ob-
tained his used furniture on consignment rather than in trade, but most ob-
servers would conclude that the proprietor was puffing a little and was just a
dealer in second-hand furniture. Surely exception (b) is not satisfied by the
unwarranted conclusion to which the Griffen court jumped. Griffin is simply
another case in a line of decisions that refuses to apply the imputation rule
against consumers, but cannot find a valid rationale for a consumer excep-
tion. ,15
Allsop v. Ernst"6 protected the consumer-consignor with yet another
theory that will do damage to the operation of section 2-326 if courts adopt it
in the commercial-consignment setting. In Allsop a widow entrusted her
deceased husband's diamond ring to her son, who, in turn, entrusted it to
110. In General Elec. Co. v. Pettingell Supply Co., 347 Mass. 631, 199 N.E.2d 326 (1964), the consignor
argued that the dealer sold consigned merchandise only under the name of the consignor, General Electric. The
court held, however, that § 2-326 applied because the dealer sold other electrical, hardware merchandise. Id. at
634, 199 N.E.2d at 329. In Newhall no suggestion was made that the retailer sold antiques and collectibles under
any name other than her own. Pettingell correctly suggests that a court should look to the character of the
dealer's nonconsigned inventory only when the dealer is selling consigned goods under the name of the con-
signor.
11I. 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 492 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1960).
112. Id. at 492-93.
113. Id. at 494-95.
114. Id. at 494.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 89-111.
116. 20 Bankr. 627 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
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Roudebush, "a person who knew about jewelry (including diamonds) and had
experience buying and selling jewelry and diamonds."" t 7 The parties stip-
ulated that Roudebush had a business card designating his business as
"Stephen's Jewelry Company," but neither the stipulation nor the court's
opinion indicate whether the card bore any address. The stipulation did in-
dicate, however, that while Roudebush held the ring he rented a place of
business for two months, received and made telephone calls from a jeweler's
office, and engaged in some sales talk in a cocktail lounge where he was well
known."'8
The parties stipulated that the entrustment was pursuant to an oral
understanding that Roudebush would solicit offers for the ring and convey
them to the owner." 9 The oral understanding further provided that
Roudebush himself could not "purchase" the ring.' 20 Thus, the stipulation
established a delivery that would fall within the imputation rule if Roudebush
maintained a place of business where he dealt in goods of the kind, as subsec-
tion 2-326(3) purports to require.
Relying heavily on the ostensible-ownership rationale, the court found
the "place of business" evidence insufficient.12' Because the rule rests on
ostensible-ownership considerations, the court intimates, the gravamen of the
consignor's conduct is that of misleading creditors. "[U]ltimate liability
should rest with the party who has 'permitted' the consignment to take place
without notice to the creditors, i.e., upon the party who was in a position to
prevent the loss to both parties."'2a Two facts in particular moved the court:
first, prior to the time Roudebush rented an office of his own the owner had
requested him to return the ring;'2 and second, the record did not show "that
the diamond was 'inventoried' at the place of business."' 24 Thus, the court
applied agency principles and ruled against the claim of Roudebush's trustee
in bankruptcy. '"
Several reported cases126 indicate that owners frequently sell jewelry
under similar entrustment arrangements to agents who are "transient"-the
word used by the Allsop court to describe Roudebush. 2 7 These marketing
efforts clearly resemble the old factor method of selling, in which consign-
ments were an important commercial device. Undoubtedly, the "place of
117. Id. at 628.
118. Id. at 628-29.
119. Id. at 629.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 630.
122. Id. at 630-31.
123. Id. at 631.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 630-31.
126. See, e.g., Kimberly & European Diamonds, Inc. v. Burbank, 634 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1982); Bischoffv.
Thomasson, 400 So. 2d 359 (Ala. 1981). Cf. W.N. Provenzano, Inc. v. Monahan & Co. (In re Monahan & Co.),
13 Bankr. 248 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687 (Utah 1980) (other cases involving
attempts to sell or market gems by means of entrustment).
127. 20 Bankr. 627, 631 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
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business" requirement of subsection 2-326(3) was designed to free factors,
such as a traveling jewelry salesman, from the imputation rule. If, as this
Article contends, ostensible ownership no longer serves as a valid rationale
for the consignment rule of section 2-326, courts might dispense with the place
of business requirement altogether. 2 If the valid rationale for the rule is the
policy of treating all consignors as unsecured lenders, the place of business
requirement is superfluous.
It is not necessary, however, to dispense with the place of business
requirement to criticize the Allsop holding. The record in Allsop demon-
strated that Roudebush did maintain a place of business-with another
jeweler for one period and in an office building for another. If the consignor in
Allsop had been a commercial venturer, it is difficult to see why the entruster
should escape the fraud presumption that this Article advocates. The Allsop
court could have avoided these harmful distinctions by resting its ruling on an
explicit consumer exception.
Bischoff v. Thomasson 29 is another jewelry case. In Bischoff, however,
the court went out of its way to reject-some of the proconsumer decisions.
Even if the entruster had been a consumer, the court held that it would not
bend the rule to protect him. 3'
In Bischoff the individual owner of a diamond ring entrusted it to a
diamond merchant who maintained a place of business where he sold gems.
Bischoff, the owner, who purchased the ring with plans for resale at a
profit, ' 3' clearly was a speculator. The court properly noted that he was not a
consumer and that any inference in the Allgeier and Fegett cases that con-
sumer consignors should escape subsection 2-326(3) was not available to Mr.
Bischoff. 32  Bischoff's lawyer, however, argued the applicability of the
Allgeier-Fegett rule 3 and the court, in a thoughtful opinion, responded.
First, the court vigorously and correctly rejected the notion that parties
can escape the rule of section 2-326 by showing that they intended to create
only a bailment or agency relationship. Such an arrangement, the court held,
is subject to the imputation rule of subsection 2-326(3), and, therefore, Mr.
128. Because the ostensible-ownership rationale no longer serves the consignment rule, courts might be
justified in omitting from § 2-326(3) the requirement that the dealer maintain a place of business where he sells
goods of the kind. That reading would carry this Article's thesis to its natural conclusion. Arguably, the result in
these cases should not turn on the question of whether the dealer maintains such a place of business or whether
he carried gems in his car or his brief case. In some of these cases the transient will have a business card, as
Roudebush did in Allsop. The address on the card or the place where the transient has a telephone could be his
place of business. If courts strictly enforce the place of business aspect of § 2-326(3), some true consignments
will escape the imputation rule. Thus, in Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687 (Utah 1980), the court concluded that
three kinds of consignments exist: false consignments, which Article 9 governs; true consignments that fall into
§ 2-326; and true consignments that do not fall within § 2-326 and, therefore, are subject to general agency
principles. Id. at 691-92.
129. 400 So. 2d 359 (Ala. 1981).
130. See infra text accompanying notes 132-35.
131. 400 So. 2d 359, 367 (Ala. 1981).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 366.
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Bischoff s entrustment was a sale or return that rendered his ownership of the
diamond vulnerable to the claims of the gem merchant's creditor. 134 With
equal vigor the Bischoff court characterized Allgeier and Fegett as "maverick
cases" and warned against eroding the "comprehensive statutory scheme of
the UCC ... [with] an ad hoe balancing of the equities." 35
The Bischoff court was unwilling to accept a consumer exception outside
the statutory framework. The problem, then, is to provide a framework that
will avoid the baleful consequences of these cases. On the one hand are courts
that misconstrue the language of the section and resort to ad hoc justice, while
on the other is the Bischoff court, which would deny protection to the
consumer.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the first instance, this Article attempts to provide a framework for a
consumer exception from the language of the statute itself. It is difficult to
draft legislation that meets all contingencies, and it is easy to propose dif-
ferent language for section 2-326 after it has been enacted. Thus, as the
Bischoff court argued, if the drafters had intended to exclude consumer con-
signors from the provision they could have limited its application to transac-
tions "between merchants," as they did in other provisions. 36 The possibility
remains, however, that the drafters of the section did not consider the con-
sumer consignor and did not anticipate the modern practices of creditors,
which no longer rely on ostensible ownership, but either verify that ownership
or rely on credit ratings. The drafters clearly knew that they had neither
considered nor anticipated all possibilities. They provided, then, for such
contingencies by stipulating in section 1-102, the first operative section in the
Act, that the Code should be construed liberally to promote modernization of
the law. 37 They suggested, moreover, that courts, having the benefit of hind-
sight, should limit application of each provision of the statute to its reason. 138
By adopting section 1-102, the legislatures have approved this case-code ap-
proach. 3
9
134. Id. at 367.
135. Id.
136. Id. The court might have added that the Code also has carved out explicit exceptions for the consumer
transaction. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1)(d), -307(2) (1978). Cf. supra note 16.
137. U.C.C. § 1-102() (1978).
138. Id. comment I.
139. See id. Professor Llewellyn illustrated the effect of the policy in a statement to the New York Law
Revision Commission concerning complaints of a trade group. The group objected to the Code's risk-of-loss
rule, which assumed that sellers insure sold goods that remain on their premises, because it would operate
unfairly against farm sellers who do not carry such insurance. "I should have some hope that a court, seeing the
reason for the rule announced in the comment, and knowing that farmers are not within that reason, might arrive
at the conclusion that for this purpose the farmer who is so worrying the majority of the Commerce and Industry
Association's Task Group would not be a merchant: cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex." I REPORT OFTHE NEW
YORK L. REVN COMM'N FOR 1954, HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 124 (1954) (tes-
timony of K. Llewellyn) (emphasis in original). Thus, no need exists to amend § 2-326. The case-code aspect of
the statute, exemplified in Professor Llewellyn's testimony, provides courts with the mechanism necessary to
meet the exigency this Article describes.
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The proper inquiry in consumer-consignor cases, then, is determining
whether application of section 2-326 to the consumer serves a valid purpose.
If creditors do not rely on a merchant's ostensible ownership of goods, but,
instead, either verify that ownership by record searches, audits, and similar
inquiry or rely on credit histories, then the ostensible-ownership doctrine is
not a valid reason for the consignment rule of Article 2 under modem com-
mercial practices. The rule does find support, however, in the idea that the
law must discourage commercial entrusters that seek to use the consignment
device to achieve a status more favorable than that accorded other parties
which have unperfected security interests. Thus, it is more efficient to pre-
sume fraud-that is, to presume that the wholesaler is a secured party which
should perfect-because the judicial costs and uncertainty in distinguishing
true from false consignments in commercial entrustment situations is too
great. It is more efficient to require both true and false commercial consignors
to disclose their interests under either Article 9 or the exceptions to the
consignment rule in subsection 2-326(3). Consumers, however, are not in-
ventory lenders. Their consignments are always true consignments. Judicial
costs and uncertainty do not attend consumer consignments, and the reason
for the rule of subsection 2-326(3) does not apply to them. If the reason does
not apply, the rule should not apply.
This Article's view that the Code should consider the status of a party is
not new, as the Article's epigraph suggests. 4 The Code often resorts to
status rules, providing, for example, special rules for banks' 4' and
merchants, 42 those dealing with farmers,' 43 and those whom Professor
Llewellyn thirty years ago called "housewives" and whom we now would call
"consumers".'44 By introducing a status issue into the section, we add to the
judicial burden. That addition, however, is generally modest and eliminates
the need either to distort the statute to protect the consumer entruster or to
follow the statute slavishly and deny the consumer protection.
Of course, ostensible ownership itself may be, as Justice Brandeis sug-
gested in Benedict, an antifraud rule.' 45 In that event, the purpose of the
ostensible-ownership doctrine is to catch transactions in which the true owner
is an inventory lender hiding his interest in a way that should render the
interest unperfected. Commercial consignors come within that purpose, but
consumer consignors, who are never inventory financers, do not. An explicit
consumer exception does no damage to the Code's solution to the commer-
cial-consignment problem; rather, it prevents courts from wrecking the Code
solution and avoids unfair treatment of consumers.
140. See supra p. 21.
141. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 5-102(1)(a) (1978).
142. See, e.g., id. § 2-103(1)(b).
143. See, e.g., id. §§ 9-109(3), -301(1)(c), -307(1).
144. See, e.g., id. § 9-307(2).
145. See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 363 (1925).
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In the second instance, this Article attempts to demonstrate the need for
reappraising the conventional justification for the Code's filing rules. If credit
investigation in particular and credit practices in general have changed, as this
Article contends they have, the ostensible-ownership justification is invalid,
but an antifraud justification holds. Analysis of the consumer-consignor ques-
tion illustrates the need to rethink application of the filing rules and suggests
that a consumer who fails to file may nonetheless defeat a competing creditor.
In the broader context this Article illustrates the need to test application of the
Code filing rules in other situations, especially those concerning consumers,
when those rules may satisfy ostensible-ownership concerns but may not
satisfy antifraud concerns.

